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I have been invited to present to you 8. kind of "verbal essay" on some of the many 
, 
issues Japan faces in its financial and securities markets t.oday. I am deli~hted to 
have this opportunity. 
Before I begin my talk) 1 first would like- to tell you of a personal connection I 
have with Columbia University. 
I graduated from college in Japan in 1946, the year after the Second World War 
ended. I joined Daiwa Securities in that same year. In 1951, I passed the 
examination for a Fulbright Scholarship for overseas studies. The site for my 
studies was to be Columbia University. 
To my great disappointment, however, shortly before I was to depart for the United 
States, I became quite ill. As a result. I neyer got the chance to study at Columbia 
after all. 
Who would have thought that 1 would be standing here forty years later, at this 
university from which I might have graduated, speaking to all of you about Japan's 
financial markets?! 1 am truly pJeased and honored~ and wouid iike to express my 
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sincere gratitude to Professor Hamao for kindly arranging this opportunity for me. 
My presentation today is entitled "A Monologue ... " which necessarily mea1lS that 
I will be the only one speaking. But rather than approaching this as though I were 
speaking in front of a large group of people, (which I ami), I would prefer to talk 
to you as though J were talking to myself about these issues alone in my study. 
Because of this, my remarks may not always strictly follow the rules of order of 
poetic composition! 
First of all, I would like to talk a bit about Daiwa Securities. I know some ofyoll 
~e probably not that familiar with it. Daiwa Securities was founded 90 years ago .. ·· 
It is the second largest securities company in Japan. It is capitalized at $1.138 
billion, of which $528 million is paid-in capital, based on the number of shares 
outstanding. Our company has $1.22 billion in statutory reserves, and $S. ] 2 billion 
in voluntary reserves. In other words, Daiwa has a total of between $6.34 and 
$6.35 billion in retained earnings. 
Daiwa Securities empJoyees roughly 10,000 people in some 130 offices in Japan 
and 30 offices overseas. We have offices in New York, Chicago, London, and 
Paris, among many other places. Daiwa' has traditionally been very strong in 
international business. There are currently more than 130 foreign companies listed 
2 
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, of which about half are American. Daiwa has 
assisted 30 of those American companies gain listing on the Exchange, aoting as 
the lead luanager OT sponsoring securities company for them. We have helped such 
well-known as IBM, Citicorp, and ITT. companies which are at the forefront of 
American business. 
We at Daiwa are also very proud to have introduced several innovative produots 
to the international capital markets. One such product was the Asian dollar bond 
which Daiwa Securities first introduced in Singapore some 20 years ago. 15 years 
ago, Daiwa created the first Euroyen bond issue in dIe Euro currency markets. 
Most recently, Daiwa designed ~e first yen bond in Asia. the Asian yen bond. As 
you can see, our company has a long tradition of many "pioneer" type activities in -
the international capital markets. 
I think it is particularly timely to be talking about corporate business perfonnance 
at Columbia Business School. There is cun'ently much restructuring going on in 
Japan. First, I would like to remind you of Daiwa's hearty retained earnings which 
J mentioned earlier, ~hich are characteristic of Japanese securities companies. In 
that connection, I would also like to describe the nature of some of the 
restructuring measures we are taking during these recessionary times. 
Even though we must streamline to some degree due to the current climate, four 
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or five out of any ten rationalization, or streamlinillg, measures we lake are in the 
fonn of forward looking investment aimed at positioning for the future. . TJ}is 
custom is not Daiwa's alone. Most companies' in Japan operate in this way. Great 
emphasis is placed on detemlining how much advance investment should be made 
in recessional)' times in order to be strongly positioned when circwnstances 
improve. It is also very important to invest witl} an eye toward the more distant 
future. For this reason, we at Daiwa are extremely busy even during periods of 
slow, or no economic growth. Perhaps we would make a good subject for a case 
study I 
Daiwa is not a manufacturer, or "maker. II Therefore, our company's biggest 
investment for the future is made by educating our human resources. We have 
virtually no budgetary controls in this area. which I think demonstrates its 
itnportance to us. Earlier, I mentioned that Daiwn has some $6.34 billion in 
retained eanlings. Our strong position today is a result of lessons we learned back 
in 1965, during the so-called "securities recession" in Japan. What we learned from 
that experience was this: it is impossibJe to avoid a recession altogether. But it 
is also extremely important to strengthen one's powers to withstand it. That lesson 
helped us greatly enhance our financial situation. As individuals. we save money 
for times of illness or other unplanned events. In tlle same way I we learned very 
well during the 1965 securities recession that, as 8 company. we need to put 
savings away for emergencies. In other words, we learned about the need for 
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reserves. Thanks to that experience, our reserves are where they are today. 
Another important element is rigorous inventory control. Looking back, 1 am 
convinced that poor inventory management was 8 primal), cause of the securities 
recession in 1965. Because we understood this point, we bega11 and ended the 
recent "boom" era under a policy of strict inventory management. As a result. we 
suffered almost no losses from holding large positions in securities. 
But what have we learned from the recent collapse of the so-called "bubble" in 
Japan? First of all, over the next 10, 15, or 20 years, we must realize that if there 
are peaks, there will also be valleys. This is simply part of the business cycle. We 
must look carefully and humbly at the lessons to be leaated from this bubble 
phenomenon. Then we must incorporate our findings into our current and future 
business methods. 
Here. I would like to tell you a little st.ory by way of illustration. Back in 1968, 
I was in New York on a business trip and happened to be involved in an auto 
accident. I broke my left leg. I was taken to Roosevelt Hospital on West 59th 
Street, where I underwent emergency surgery. The doctors told me that I had a 
compound fracture. 
Shortly aft.er I entered the hospital, an elderly man moved in to the room next to 
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mine. He was vet)' kind to me in many ways. It seems he had been the manager 
of 8. circus which traveled around the United States. Soon after arriving, he 
appeared in my room, asking all kinds of questions like, "Do you have enough 
money?" "Can you pay the hospital bills? This Roosevelt hospital is 8 very 
expensive hospital, you know." He helped me· find a nurse. He arranged for a 
chamber pot. He even said that, if I didn't have enough money, ho would negotiHte 
with the government for me so that 1 would be able to pay! He was vel)' kind 
indeed. 
I stayed ill the hospital for 2 weeks, receiving medication. When it was time for 
me to leave, the elderly man escorted me to the entrance way. There, he told me 
he was having a lung operation the following week. I will never forget how kind 
that man was to me. At that time, we were insured with a life insurance policy 
during overseas busi.ness trips, but we didn't have insurance against ilin~ss or 
injwy. I somehow managed to pay the bospital bill myself. After that, our 
company did get insurance which would cover accidents on business trips overseas. 
But at the time, I was so fortunate to have that nice old man wony about even the 
matter of money for me. 
I was staying at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel on that business trip to New York. But 
ever since the auto accident, I decided 110t to stay in that hotel. I'm not 
particularly superstitious) but I'm afraid I will be reminded of the pain of my 
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broken leg if J stay there. So I don't! 
Getting back to our subject, Japan's economy does not have 8 broken leg and does 
not need to be hospitalized, as I was. But we ca.ll at least say that Japan's economy 
is "under the weather" and needs some good medicine. Many things have 
contributed to its current condition. Just as my fracture was a compound fracture, 
the current "post-bubble" recession in Japan j!\ a compound, complex recession. 
The name "compound recession" was coined by a famous economist, and I think 
it is an excellent name. There are certainly many geniuses among university 
professors~ their forecasts are often inaccurate, but they are extremely skillful at 
analysis! 
One of the most important lessons we have learned from this "bubbJe" and its 
collapse relates to Japanese banks. Japanese banks have been generally regarded 
as "strong." They used to line up on the list of the top t.en banks in the world. 
Notice that I put this in the past tense. They were extremely strong. But after the 
"bubb1e" burst, I took an X-ray of their business and realized that Japanese banks 
have weak points along with their strong points! The Chinese have a saying which 
goes something like this, "A good safe has hidden compartments." A good 
businessman never piles all of his wares up in the front of the store. Instead, he 
keeps many goods in the warehouse. This saying means that it is better for a 
businessman to keep some goods in the back store room than to put all of his 
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goods out in the store window. I think this saying applies to Japanese banks. 
Many huge numbers are batted around with regard to the amowlt of "hidden assets" 
that Japanese banks have. The point is, they don't only have holdings of stocks. 
They also have large amounts of land and other assets. They also own affiliated 
companies. As 8 result, it would be very" difficultt if not impossible for them to 
write down or amortize all of their nOll-performing assets all at once, even if 
someone told them to do so. But I believe that., over a period of several years, 
they will be able to pare down all of them, and do so without having t.o borrow 
funds from the public. 
That is one of the points of strength of Japanese banks. But they have weak 
points, too. Let me give you one or two examples. Unlike banks in the United 
States, Japanese banks are pennitted to ~nvest ill common stock in their P01ifolios. 
The reason for this goes back to 1945 and the end of World Wa.r II. When the 
War ended, Japan's "Zaibatsu," or financial cliques, were ordered to disband. 
When the shares that the fanner Zaibatsu had held were released onto the open 
markel, the stock market and the general investor public still had limited money to 
spare for investment. As a result. a large portion of the shares which had been 
held by the Zaibatsu were bought up by financial institutions, such as banks and 
life insurance companies, and by business corporatiolls. That event began the 
tradition of common stock holding by Japanese banks. 
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In any event, nowadays, banks must comply with BIS standards and maintain 8 
ratio of owned capital at a level above 8%. Japanese banks are able to count 45% 
of the market value of their stock holdings toward this requirement. Until recently, 
Japan's stock market had continued to rise over a period of 10 or 20 years, and this 
system was a plus. No one predicted the kind of decline we have just witnessed, 
and therefore owned capital was valuated up to the 45% level. 
Until recently, this was no problem, as long as we were riding on the wave of the 
stock market's rise. After the "bubble" burst, however, people realized just how 
dangerous it was for banks to rely on their stock holdings and on this 45% 
valuation level of them. The mere fact that banks were dependent on 45% of the 
market value of the stocks they held meant that their owned capital was extremely 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the level of the stock market. That realization has 
added to the uneasiness of the situation. Previously, while the stock market was 
rising) nobody realized this drawback. But since the "bubble" burst four years ago, 
stock prices have lost more than half their value, and with them. the owned capital 
of Japanese banks has fallen dramatically. In some cases, it has even dipped below 
the 8% requirement of the BIS. 
This has been one area of weakness of Japanese banks. The lesson to be learned 
from this is that banks must decrease their degree of reliance on their stock 
holdings from the current 45% level .... gradually, by degrees. The ideal level of 
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reliance would be zero, but in any event, there needs to be a system in which a 
vicious circle between stock price fluctuations and owned capital and BIS standards 
does not arise. 
Another related point concems the 8% BIS standard itself. Even though Japanese 
banks have a very strong foundation, I believe that the next step should be to raise 
the requirement from 8% to 10%, or even higher. We have no way of knowing 
when the next period of financial instability might occur, but certainly, a ratio of 
owned capital of 8% is not adequate. Japanese banks will need to aim for 10%, 
like U.S. banks, or even 12%, as in England. 
Now, I would like to talk a bit about lessons we have learned, and lessons we need 
to lea.~, in the securities markets. What kinds of things should we b~ reflecting 
on? 
DUring my career at Daiwa, I have probably spent more time in the Equity 
Department than in any other area, since 1961. I was the head of the Equity 
Department, and more recently, I was a director in charge of that area. If you look 
at the WhQ's WhQ directory put out by a famous Japanese newspaper, you will find 
that I am credited with promoting internationalization of Japan's capital markets. 
The directory also says that I am the one who introduced the concept of Price 
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Earnings Ratios. or the theory of growth stocks, to the Japanese stock market. 
Back in the 1960s. the mainstream thinking in the Japanese slocK market was to 
buy stocks based on their dividend yields rather than 011 a11alysis of their price 
earnings ratios. Also at that time, stocks were offered not at market value but at 
par value. In contrast, I argued that, although' it was only natural to purchase 
stocks which were profitable on the basis of dividend yield, it was also time to start 
considering stock purchases based on potential for growth. At the time, the PER 
theory I advocated was somewhat contrary t.o the traditional emphasis on dividend 
yield. But I believe that the essential make up of a stock market calls for looking 
at various kinds of stocks; there are those which should be purcbased for dividend 
yield, those which have growth potential, and those which are in between. 
As it turns out, since the 1970s, the Japanese stock market has been placing less 
and less emphasis on dividend yield. Increasingly, mainstream attention is being 
placed on the selection of growth stocks. Japanese economic growth has been 
extremely high, and as 8 result, so has the growth of corporations. Corporations are 
the supporters of the growth economy in Japan. Thus; it should have been only 
natural that stocks with price growth potential should be preferred over stocks 
offering only dividend yield. But then, in the latter half of the 1970s, dividend 
yields on Japanese stocks plunged below intemationallevels. 
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It may seem simple, but a stock market should offer a mixture of growth stocks 
and those with good dividend yields. From an investor's perspective, this mixture 
is. necessary in order to build a sound portfolio. Today, the average dividend yie1d 
on shares of major Japanese corporations is less than one percent. Let's look for 
a moment at the stock market in the United States.' Since J anu8l)' of this yearp the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average has risen about 30%, while the yield is roughly 
2.9%. By contrast, the rise in the Dow Jones Public Utilities Average has paled. 
It rose only about 1.3% over the same period. But the dividend yield offered on 
those utility stocks continues to be around 6.5%. In short, we can see that in the 
United States stock market, there is a c1ear distinction between yield stocks and 
growth stocks. But they co-exist. 
In Japan, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, stocks with good yiolds and stocks 
promising capital gains also co-existed in the market. With that in mind, let'~ think 
about the reason for the Jarge number of growth stocks in the Japanese securities 
markets today_ For one thing, I believe it. indicates that there are many growth 
companies in Japan, reflecting both Japanese economic strength and corporate 
growth potential. But I also get the feeling that more stocks with good dividend 
yields could appear. 
During the recent stock market decline. th.e first stocks to bottom out were those 
of the electric power companies. As soon as the dividend yield of electric power 
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shares dropped to the 2.5% level. that dividend yield acted as a safeguard 
mechanism and stopped the shares from falling further. This shows us that the 
divjdend yield mentality stills lives among invest~rs. Some oryou might think that 
a yield of2.5% is pretty low. But if you consider that Japan's official discount rate 
is now 3.25%, and also that the interest rate on time deposits is just over 3%, the 
2.5% yield 011 electric utility shares doesn't seem so bad after all! 
I cannot judge whether or not the current level of Japanese stock pnces is 
appropriate. But r do think that patterns of business management behavior at 
Japanese corporations during previous recessions can be used as a good reference. 
qr course, companies have been trimming excess fat that they gained during recent 
boom times. But as I said earlier, most Japanese corporations have not cut their 
research and development budgets during the current economic slump. 
Daiwa is no different. We are now streamlining various unprofitable areas which 
unfortunately emerged during the recent economic boom. But even so, we have 
created a medium and long-teon vision. We are making a variety of advance 
investments with this vision in mind, particularly in terms of employee education 
and training. There are also areas of research and development which are 
appropriate for a securities company. We have not cut allY forward looking 
investment along those lines either. These types of actions and policies are not 
peculiar to Daiwa Securities. Most Japanese corporations engage in this type of 
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behavior during recessionary times. 
When Japan's economy rebounded after the Second World War, people said it was 
a "miracle." But after the first oil shock, Japan's economy was again thrown into 
chaos, which prompted some foreign critics to say that the "miracJe" had ended. 
Nevertheless, we were able to overcome that crisis pretty impressively. People say 
that a miracle can only occur once. It was thus recognized that the reason that 
Japan's economy was able to rebound a second time was due to hard work and 
ability. I do not believe that Japan or Japanese companies have lost that ability to 
recover from recession even now. They are tremendously resilient. 
As a result, I think that we will soon see that strong adaptability begin to blossom 
in the case of the Japanese stock market. One lesson that seems tt) have been 
learned from the decline in shar~ prices after the bubble burst is that issuer~ have 
come to consider the value of returning profits to shareholders. A new concept is 
gaining wide acceptance; that is, that corporate shares are actually products 
constructed by a company's board of directors. Quality control of that product is 
the responsibility of the issuer. Also, more and more shares are being issued at 
market value. but there is still no system in Japan under which issuing companies 
can own their own shares. Such a system is currently under rush preparation in the 
legal system. Management thinking regarding stockholders and share prices is 
undcrgoing many dramatic changes. 
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After entering the current recession~ we have realized just how important 
shareholder capital is. Or rather, we have been reminded of its importance. I 
believe that this reaJization will be a major supporting factor in the stock market. 
Unless stocks are of high quality, meaning unless stocks are made sufficiently 
attractive to investors, whether with good dividend yields or with 8towth potential. 
the stock market will not be viable. A mood js growing among issuing companies 
that says that stocks must be attractive to investors so that they will hold them for 
the long tenn. I believe this growing mood will support Japanese stocks and their 
prices. I also believe that we will soon begin to see long-term oriented buying of 
growth stocks, whose prices dropped along with the recent plunge in the stock 
market. 
Here, I would like to mention one other interesting element in the Japanese 
financial markets. During the postwar reconstruction period, Japan relied primarily 
on banks for its reconstruction funds. Thus, unlike American companies, Japanese 
companies have long depended on indirect financing from banks. As a result, they 
have large amounts of money on deposit with banks, compared with American 
companies. For example, according to some statistics, American companies have, 
at any given time on average, a deposit amount equivalent to 9 days of sales 
proceeds. In contrast. just before the bubble burst. Japanese companies had about 
50 days - worth on deposit. Some companies even had 60 days .. worth. Under 
ordinary circumstances, Japanese companies usually have the equivalent of about 
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30 days - worth of sales proceeds on deposit. But with the protracted period of 
low interest rates in Japan. at the peak of the bubble, in which a glut of money 
prevailed. the liquidity of Japanese companies increased sharply, to anywhere 
between 50 and 70 days - worth of sales proceeds .. Compared with the 9 - day 
equivalent of American companies. this was an enormous amount. 
Recently. growth in the money supply in Japan is said to be slowing. Even so, 
excluding some small and medium-sized companies and marginal producers and 
cottage industries, most companies in Japan continue to have deposits of the 
equivalent of up to 30 days - worth of sales proceeds. While it might not be 
possible to decrease these amounts to the equivalent of U.S. levels over night, it 
is not enough to decrease them to 20 or 30 days-worth. In any event. as the 
amount of excess liquid deposits is decreased, and corporations are not in need of 
funds from banks, money supply in Japan will decrease somewhat, as 8 matter of 
course. 
The next subject I would like to discuss is the barrier between the securities and 
banking industries. How will the Japanese securities markets change when the wall 
between these two is lowered and banks and securities companies can engage more 
in each other's lines of business? 
After the Great Depression of 1929, the boundary between the securities and the 
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banking businesses in the U.S. was clearly drawn with the introduction of the 
Securities and Exchange Act. As I reeal1, the main reason that this Act was 
introduced was to deal with such things as insider trading abuses and conflicts of 
interest. I can't remember whether there was debate at the time about the d~ger 
of monopolization of financial functions by banks,' or distinctions between direct 
and indirect financing. 
In Japans in the period before the war. the Zaibatsu were present, and at the center 
of the Zaibatsu were the banks. As a result, both direct and indirect financing 
centered around the banks. Just what were the securities companies doing at that 
time? r believe that they were acting as sort of sub-contracted underwriters of 
stocks and bonds which banks had primarily underwritten. They were also 
involved with he secondary distribution of these securities. The long and short of 
ii was, both direct and indirect financing was effectively controlled by banks. 
The Securities and Exchange Law, which was adopted in Japan after the War, 
changed that. Article 65 of that Act separated the banking and securities 
businesses. Japan has operated under this law until tOday, but now change is in the 
wind. Revisions of the Law are proceeding, and moves are being made to lower 
the barrier between banks and securities companies, thereby allowing (he two to 
handle each other's lines of business. Nevertheless, you are probably aware of the 
tenn in Japan, "main bank." The concept of a having "main bank" is still alive and 
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well among Japanese corporations. This system certainly has its merits. One of 
the most obvious is that, if a corporate client lapses into recession, it is common 
practice for its "main bank" to assume responsibility and extend finanCial 
assistance. 
If such "main banks" are to handle even the securities business, and thus have both 
direct and indirect financing in their grasp, there is a very real danger of monopoly, 
or oligopoly, in tenns of financial functions. The consciousness of having long 
been a Zaibatsu bank, or having .tong been a member of a group and its resultant 
personal network. is not that easily erased. 
In conclusion, from the perspective of a business corporation which issues 
securities in the markets, I think that it is better to have the freedom to choose 
between. procuring funds dire--ctly from the securities markets or procuring them 
indirectly from bank loans. If the power that banks have over business companies 
becomes too strong, however, companies will lose the feeling of freedom of choice .. 
Fitlancial decision-making will become tilted in the direction of banks. If the past 
is any indicator, there was a long period during the last 30 yea.rs in which issuing 
companies were tightly in the grip of their "main banks" and were subject to their 
will and intentions. 
What we are worried about is this; even tliOue.h current trends would have us 
..... 
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lower the barrier between banks and securities companies, it is still a troublesome 
situation to have issuers lose their freedom of choice, as they might if both 
fillatlcial functions were held ill one hand. 
On this point. J will end my "monologue. II for fear of being termed an Alzheimer'S 
case if I go on any longer! 
One final note; two years ago. I had occasion to act as a lecturer for six months 
at Yokohama National University. The topic was, "The Securities Business as an 
Industry. II Recalling how painful it was to prepare the texts for each session, I 
would like to pay tribute to the hard work professors Hugh Patrick and Yasushi 
Hamao must put in everyday. I admire you both. 
Thank you V(;;ry much. 
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